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Abstract
The past two decades have seen dramatic increases in women occupying positions of
political power. Such developments have been welcomed as a means of achieving better
outcomes for women in their everyday lives. We interrogate this proposition, developing a
“gendered accountability” framework to the delineate conditions under which female rep-
resentation should have its desired effects. Our empirical analysis applies this framework
to sub-Saharan Africa, home to the largest increase in women’s political representation
in recent years. We find that having more women in the legislature is robustly associated
with reduced infant and child mortality as well as greater spending on health. The effect
on infant mortality is magnified when women are more active in civil society, and con-
strained to countries that have gender quotas and a proportional electoral system. We do
not, however, find consistent evidence that maternal mortality and access to clean water
respond to female representation.
1 Introduction
The past two decades have seen dramatic increases in women occupying positions of
political power. Such developments have been welcomed as means of achieving better
outcomes for women in their everyday lives (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Barnes and
Burchard, 2013). While an emerging empirical literature lends support to this proposition
(Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Swiss, Fallon and
Burgos, 2012), there is also evidence that female representatives do not always promote
or implement policies that benefit women (Wa¨ngnerud, 2009; Franceschet and Piscopo,
2008). In general, studies of how the election of female representatives affects policy
outcomes that touch the everyday lives of citizens are few and far between (Wa¨ngnerud
and Sundell, 2012). What has been published on the topic suggests that increased female
representation is not a magic bullet, and that there is a need to understand the conditions
under which it is likely to have its desired effects.
This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature in two ways. First, we examine varia-
tion across policy outcomes, in order to understand how increased female representation
relates to the delivery of different public services that disproportionately benefit women.
Second, we delineate societal and institutional conditions necessary for descriptive rep-
resentation (greater proportions of women in the legislature) to generate substantive
representation (improved policy outcomes for women). We build on Hannah Pitkin’s
(1967) influential conceptualization of representation and advance the concept of “gen-
dered accountability,” applying a principal-agent framework to understand when and
how female citizens can effectively hold their (female) representatives to account to en-
sure that their interests are represented. We argue that the link between descriptive and
substantive representation is stronger when female citizens are more actively engaged in
politics and society. We also show how this link is conditioned by the institutional rules
and procedures through which representatives are chosen.
Our empirical analysis looks across countries in sub-Saharan Africa, home to the
world’s largest increase in women’s political representation in recent years and a context
in which the propositions we make have not been studied in depth. Many African coun-
tries are also characterized by considerable gender inequality, which manifests in ways
that public policy could address (Duflo, 2012). We examine three policy outcomes that
disproportionately affect women and girls: maternal and infant mortality, and access
to clean water. These outcomes also correspond to widely agreed upon international
development priorities, lending our study concrete policy relevance.
We find that having more women in the legislature is robustly associated with lower
numbers of infant and children deaths, and greater spending on healthcare. We conduct
placebo tests to provide further confidence that this relationship is not spurious, or simply
a matter of “all good things going together.” Furthermore, we also find a statistically
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significant interaction between female citizens’ participation and the share of women
in the legislature when it comes to reducing infant mortality, suggesting that female
politicians are more likely to be held accountable for furthering women’s policy priorities
when female citizens are monitoring their actions. In addition, we examine how different
dimensions of formal representation condition the degree to which gendered accountability
is achieved. Specifically, we show that female descriptive representation only improves
outcomes in countries that have gender quotas and some degree of proportionality in their
electoral systems.
We find that access to clean water and maternal mortality demonstrate less consistent
movement in response to increased female representation. We argue that this reflects
barriers to policy implementation specific to these outcomes. These obstacles include
limits to credit-claiming by politicians, divisions in the policy community, and a lack
of salience to the broader public. Furthermore, our empirical results may represent an
underestimate of the true impact on substantive representation if we consider substantive
representation in more process-oriented terms (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). That is,
female legislators may still be taking action on behalf of their female constituents (e.g.,
contributing to parliamentary debates or advancing legislation); however, such actions
are not always translated into policies that achieve their intended effects.
More generally, we contribute to the systematic study of variation in the policy pri-
ority accorded to human development initiatives, a topic that has been understudied to
date (Shiffman and Smith, 2007). Beyond policy priorities, the systematic study of pol-
icy implementation in the developing world has also received limited scholarly attention
(Shiffman, 2007).
That there are few other cross-country studies of the relationship between women’s
political representation and policy outcomes benefiting women may reflect the challenge of
causal inference that this type of analysis entails. For instance, women’s representation
tends to be correlated with voter preferences,(Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014) and
there may be other country-specific factors affecting both the election of women and the
enactment of policies that women are more likely to prefer. We account for such threats
to causal inference to the best of our abilities by controlling for variables whose omission
could bias our results and including country and year fixed effects. We also test a variety
of model specifications, including system-GMM models that are well suited to deal with
slow-moving variables and potential endogeneity.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines our theoretical framework,
after which we describe our empirical strategy and data. We then present our results and
discuss their implications as concerned to the present study and future research.
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2 Gendered Accountability: Achieving Women’s Rep-
resentation
Hannah Pitkin’s influential volume (1967) presents four main “views” or dimensions
of representation. First, formal representation refers to the rules and procedures used
to select representatives; descriptive representation captures the similarity (in terms of
race, ethnicity, gender, etc.) between representatives and the people they purportedly
represent; symbolic representation reflects the degree to which a representative “stands
for” the represented; and substantive representation relates to the actions taken on behalf
of, or in the interest of the represented. Pitkin presents an integrated notion of these
views; however, most empirical work on representation has tended to examine one or two
of them in isolation. One notable exception is Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005), who
develop an integrated model, in which formal representation strongly influences both
descriptive and symbolic representation. Descriptive representation, in turn, increases
the responsiveness of legislatures to women’s policy concerns and enhances perceptions
of legitimacy (symbolic representation).
Our notion of “gendered accountability” takes a different point of departure. We
apply a principal-agent framework to delineate conditions under which descriptive repre-
sentation is most likely to lead to substantive representation. We argue that this link will
be strengthened when female citizens are more actively engaged in politics and society (a
consequence of symbolic representation). We also show how this link is conditioned by
the institutional rules and procedures through which female representatives are chosen
(aspects of formal representation).
Following Lindberg (2013, p.209), we employ a conceptualization of accountability
that gets at the core meaning of the term as it has been used across disciplines. By this
standard, accountability has five defining characteristics:
1. An agent or institution who is to give an account (A for agent);
2. An area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability (D for domain);
3. An agent or institution to whom A is to give account (P for principal);
4. The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to
D; and
5. The right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or explain/justify decisions
with regard to D.
When applied to gendered accountability, this standard definition takes the following
form. First, the relevant agents are women in positions of political power. The domain
in question is policy areas that disproportionately affect women, while the principals are
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female citizens. The nature and degree of answerability and sanctions varies in light of
societal and institutional features that we describe in further detail below.
Our framework has two fundamental assumptions, which reinforce each other. First,
we assume female agents are more likely to prioritize and implement policies that benefit
women. This reflects the average tendency of female agents (and women in general) to
have preferences that diverge from those of male agents (and men in general). Second,
we assume that female principals will be more likely to hold female agents to account.
We justify these assumptions below.
2.1 Substantive Representation and Divergent Preferences
The expectation that female politicians will better represent the concerns of female con-
stituents requires that men and women diverge to some degree in terms of their policy
preferences (Phillips, 1995). Empirical evidence from a range of contexts supports this
assumption. In general, women tend to favor redistribution more than men, even con-
trolling for political ideology (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006;
Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2012). Scholars have also identified gender gaps
with respect to partisan alignment (women tending to vote to the left of men) and voting
behavior (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Corder and Wolbrecht, 2016).
Relatively less scholarly attention has been paid to gender gaps in policy preferences
in developing countries, but some recent work suggests that divergent preferences may be
even more common in such cases, if qualitatively distinct from those of wealthier countries.
For instance, women are consistently shown to have greater preferences for improved water
provision in studies from Indonesia (Olken, 2010), India (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004)
and Pakistan Khan (2017). Looking across 27 African countries, Gottlieb, Grossman and
Robinson (2016) find that women are significantly more likely to prioritize government
investment in poverty alleviation, health and access to clean water. In contrast, men
are more likely to prioritize the management of the economy, infrastructure, agriculture,
violence, and social and political rights. Clayton, Josefsson, Mattes and Mozaffar (2018)
find support for such differences and also present evidence for mass-elite policy congruence
along gendered lines.
As for why such divergent preferences might arise, scholars highlight differences in the
social structures in which men and women live, rather than attributes of individual men
and women. For example, since women are often disproportionately involved in childcare,
they tend to be more directly concerned with child health and nutrition. Moreover,
much of the developing world is characterized by a sexual division of labor, with women
bearing primary responsibility for collecting drinking water for their households. Even
where women do not have this obligation, their childcare responsibilities can motivate
a disproportionate concern for clean water, given the prevalence of waterborne diseases
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Khan (2017). Therefore, we can expect women to support policies that will improve these
outcomes.
Such divergent policy preferences can manifest in campaigns and party platforms,
with female politicians campaigning more on issues that matter to women, and their
election helping to ensure that such concerns are represented in government. However,
we can still expect female politicians to better represent the interests of female voters
even if they campaign on platforms that are not particularly gendered or on party tickets
that promote broader interests. As Phillips (1995) points out, “representatives... have
considerable autonomy, which is part of why it matters who those representatives are”
(p. 44).’ As she argues, under a strict definition of representation, politicians only truly
represent their constituents on the issues that were explicitly debated during the election
campaign. On all other issues, they necessarily rely on their own judgement or prejudice.
If we expect that women and men tend to differ on average in terms of their judgements
and prejudices, female constituents should be better represented by female politicians
even if those politicians do not campaign on “women’s” issues.
Indeed, there is evidence from a range of contexts that female representatives tend
to prioritize the interests of female voters (Wa¨ngnerud, 2009; Franceschet and Piscopo,
2008; Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2017; Burnet, 2011). Considerably fewer studies
have examined how female representation affects the outcomes of public policy. Notable
exceptions include Bratton and Ray (2002), who find that female representation (mea-
sured in terms of the proportion of women in Norwegian municipal councils) is positively
and significantly associated with the provision of child care. In addition, Wa¨ngnerud
and Sundell (2012) find having more women in Swedish local councils promotes gender
equality in terms of income, full- vs. part-time employment, and distribution of parental
leave. These studies are also important in that they examine the conditions under which
female representation affects policy outcomes. However, their focus on single countries in
Scandinavia potentially limits their broader applicability, motivating the present study.
2.2 Symbolic Representation and Women’s Participation
Our assumption that female principals will be more likely to hold female agents to account
relates to Pitkin’s notion of symbolic representation, as well as conceptualizations of
accountability that go beyond the electoral sphere. Symbolic representation implies shifts
in attitudes and habits. As such, having more women in positions of political power has
the potential to break down widely held perceptions that politics is a man’s game, which
in turn can improve women’s awareness and participation.
Indeed, political knowledge among women has been shown to be higher when more
women hold elected office (Jones, 2014). There is also evidence that descriptive repre-
sentation boosts political participation among women – whether it comes to women in
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the legislature (Barnes and Burchard, 2013), village council (Chattopadhyay and Duflo,
2004), or cabinet (Liu and Banaszak, 2017).
Beyond being aware and interested in engaging in the political sphere, women must
take action to further their interests if those interests are to be represented in a substantive
manner. Relevant actions include voting as well as acting to enforce accountability in
between elections, by making phone calls, attending meetings and demonstrations, writing
letters, emails, or opinion pieces in newspapers, and mobilizing community and activist
groups (Lindberg, 2013). The presence and actions of women’s groups (or lack thereof)
have been shown to play an important role when it comes to the enactment of policies
advancing women’s priorities (Htun and Weldon, 2010; Shiffman and Smith, 2007).
2.3 Formal Representation and Institutional Rules
Building on Pitkin (1967), we also expect that formal representation will condition the
nature and degree of answerability and sanctions when it comes to achieving gendered
accountability. In particular, we expect the following rules and procedures (institutions)
to matter: gender quotas, type of electoral system, and the extent to which there is
competition among political parties.
The adoption of gender quotas is the most prominent policy solution to ensure female
representation in politics. Relevant provisions include reserved seats, which secure a
certain number of places for women; party quotas, pledges by individual parties to aim
for a particular proportion of women among their candidates; and legislative quotas,
which require all parties to nominate a certain percentage of women to run on their
tickets (Krook, 2006b).
Previous research has also shown that electoral systems with some degree of pro-
portionality elect more women to parliament (Matland and Studlar, 1996). Whereas in
majoritarian systems parties can only nominate one candidate per district, making female
candidates compete against existing interests within a party that may be represented by
men, proportional systems allow more flexibility to nominate women (Matland, 1998).
These systems also provide less of an advantage to incumbents, reducing the barriers
to entry for female politicians (Thames and Williams, 2010). Some scholars argue that
proportionality should matter for substantive outcomes as well, since such systems tend
to be characterized by higher levels of policy congruence between voters and governments
(Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005).
Finally, democracies have more channels through which citizens can pressure their po-
litical representatives to deliver specific outcomes. Empirically, the literature has found
a strong relationship between democracy and development (Wang, Mechkova and An-
dersson, 2018; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). Scholars have also connected democracy
to improved women’s rights (Lindberg, 2004), and found that democracies tend to out-
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perform autocracies when it comes to electing women to national office (Kang and Kim,
2018). However, recent research also suggests that authoritarian regimes have the incen-
tive to coopt women, and use the provision of women’s rights, including political rights
and political representation, as a coalition building strategy (Donno and Kreft, 2018).
A comparative case study of democratic Botswana and autocratic Rwanda suggests that
democracy is not a necessary pre-condition for the adoption of gender quotas or having
more women in parliament and that other factors may be more important in determin-
ing both outcomes (Bauer and Burnet, 2013). When evaluating these diverse views, we
argue that the absence of opposition parties could constrain the extent to which women
in parliament can influence development outcomes, and therefore our analysis primarily
distinguishes between one-party and multi-party states.
2.4 Gendered Accountability in Africa
Our theoretical framework is informed primarily by studies of Western Europe and the
United States. One may rightly ask what traction theories developed in the West will
have in sub-Saharan Africa, a region characterized by a distinct political history and
institutions. That said, there are reasons to believe that certain assumptions are in fact
more credible in the African context than in settings characterized by more institution-
alized politics. Our theory currently has no role for political parties, which can play an
important role when it comes to selecting women to run for political office and supporting
their successful campaigns (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Cowell-Meyers, 2016). However,
political parties in Africa tend to be less important when it comes to aggregating soci-
etal interests and serving as vehicle for candidates to advance those interests.1 Rather,
African parties frequently serve as vehicles for ethnic identity or personal interests (Elis-
cher, 2013).2 This grants representatives in most African political systems considerably
more autonomy than their counterparts in more consolidated party systems. As noted
above, it is precisely this autonomy that makes representatives’ personal characteristics
(e.g., gender) important when it comes to promoting policies that serve the interests of
their constituents.3
Relatedly, non-electoral forms of political participation are particularly important in
many African countries, where elections often fail to serve as a source of accountability
1In 2017, Sub-Saharan countries scored an average of 0.48 on the V-Dem Party Institutionalization
Index, which ranges from 0-1 (low to high). This is significantly lower than the average score for OECD
countries of 0.91. The two regions’ scores have remained more or less constant since 2000.
2It is important to note that this tendency is not universal (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Bratton,
Bhavnani and Chen, 2012).
3In the previous section, we argue that electoral systems that reduce the importance of personal
characteristics (PR systems) are more likely to lead to women winning elections (Thames and Williams,
2010). Our contention here is distinct: once elected, women in African legislatures may have more
opportunities to act in accordance with their personal experiences than their counterparts in more
institutionalized party systems.
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due to a lack of programmatic parties and open and informed public debate (Joshi and
Houtzager, 2012). Rather, what may matter more in such contexts is the extent to which
civil society and media actors constrain government, either by enhancing the efforts of
other accountability actors or by exerting direct pressure Goetz and Jenkins (2005);
Mechkova, Lu¨hrmann and Lindberg (2018).
Moreover, as discussed above, gender is a key determinant in explaining variation in
the interests of voters in many African countries. This is largely due to gender roles
being highly circumscribed, particularly when it comes to family division of labor. For
instance, Graham, Hirai and Kim (2016) find that adult females are the primary collec-
tors of water across 24 sub-Saharan African countries. Additionally, across all countries,
female children were more likely to be responsible for water collection than male children.
Kes and Swaminathan (2006) analyze time-use surveys in five African countries, finding
that women devote substantially more time to care and domestic activities than men,
and considerably less time to market activities. Such divisions in household labor have
significant consequences outside the home. For instance, Gottlieb, Grossman and Robin-
son (2016) find that fewer than 10 percent of women report having a job that pays a
cash income in a number of African countries. Furthermore, across all countries included
in Round 7 (2016/2018) of the Afrobarometer, women are on average less likely to have
formal schooling than men.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
We test our gendered accountability framework by systematically analyzing variation in
the extent to which women’s policy priorities are implemented with a series of cross-
national, time-series regressions. We first consider how descriptive representation, oper-
ationalized as the proportion of women in the legislature, relates to the achievement of
three distinct policy outcomes that women prioritize. Second, we investigate the con-
ditions under which this relationship holds – specifically, whether it is enhanced when
women participate in civil society and the media, and when civil society organizations
advance women’s issues. Finally, we examine how gendered accountability is conditioned
by gender quotas, type of electoral system, and the extent to which political opposition
is possible.
The following sections describe the data and methods we use to measure our outcome
variables, main explanatory variables, and potential confounding variables. Table A1 in
the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for all variables, presented in the order in
which we discuss them, along with coverage, data sources, and variable construction.
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3.1 Dependent Variables
Figure 1 shows the development of our three dependent variables over time in sub-Saharan
Africa. The graphs depict a clear trend of improvement. Instances of maternal and infant
deaths have been substantially reduced in recent years. In addition, more people have
gained access to improved sources of water. Note, however, that these trends mask
significant variation across countries. For instance, the lowest rate of maternal mortality
observed in our data is 35 deaths per 100,000 cases in Mauritius in 2002, while the highest
rate is 2,900 in Sierra Leone in 1994. There is also large variation in terms of success
in the reduction of maternal deaths. For example, both Cape Verde and Rwanda have
reduced maternal mortality by over 75 percent between 1990 and 2015, achieving the
target set by the MDGs. Other countries like Nigeria and Sierra Leona failed to do so.
In fact, in Nigeria deaths associated with giving birth were estimated to account for over
19 percent of all maternal deaths worldwide in 2015 (58,000 cases), while Sierra Leone
is estimated to have the highest maternal mortality rate in the world in 2015 with 1,360
deaths (against a target of 450 deaths per 100,000 live births if the MDGs were to be
achieved) (Chou, Inoue, Mathers, Moller, Oestergaard, Say, Mills, Suzuki and Wilmoth,
2012)4
Figure 1: Trends in infant and maternal mortality, and population with improved access
to water
4In the subsequent analysis the data for maternal and infant mortality are transformed by their
natural logarithm, consistent with previous research on the topic, as the distribution of these variables is
left-skewed and there is a general downward trend in mortality in many countries in recent decades. In
addition, there is a theoretical argument for the logged transformation since improvements in mortality
rates are easier to achieve when the rate is higher.
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3.2 Main Explanatory Variable: Women in Parliament
We operationalize descriptive representation as the percentage of women in parliament.
The presence of women in this critical political institution could affect development out-
comes in several ways: for example, women parliamentarians could put women’s issues
on the political agenda, argue for the adoption of policies that address these issues, or
allocate more money from the budget for specific programs that benefit women. There is
ample evidence that many of the women who have joined the ranks of African parliaments
have taken just such actions (Bauer and Burnet, 2013; Devlin and Elgie, 2008; Johnson
and Josefsson, 2016; Yoon, 2011; Wang, 2013).
As noted above, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a dramatic increase in descrip-
tive representation over the past two decades. However, as with progress toward our
outcomes of interest, the region is also characterized by considerable variation. For in-
stance, Rwanda leads the region with a 63.8% of women in parliament in 2016. At the
lower end, the share of women in Nigeria’s and Swaziland’s parliament was 6% in 2016.5
3.3 Women’s Participation
As outlined above, we expect gendered accountability to be stronger when female citi-
zens (the principals in our framework), are active in pressuring female politicians (their
agents) to implement their priorities. They may do this directly or through civil society
organizations or the media. As proxy for this mechanism we use a latent variable that
captures the possibility for women to put pressure on their representatives in between
elections – a composite indicator from the V-Dem data set, the Women civil society par-
ticipation index, which captures three related aspects: the extent to which women are
free to openly discuss political issues, the extent to which they can form and participate
in civil society organizations, and whether they are represented in the ranks of journalists
(Coppedge et al 2018).
3.4 Institutional Rules and Procedures
Our theoretical framework also anticipates that certain institutional conditions should
affect the realization of gendered accountability. Specifically, we consider the existence of
gender quotas and whether there is mechanism to enforce these in practice, the type of
electoral system (proportional, majoritarian, or mixed), and the extent to which there is
competition among political parties. The data for these three variables comes from the
V-Dem data set (Coppedge et al 2018).
5As this variable is also left-skewed, we also test the robustness of our findings by using a log trans-
formation.
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3.5 Endogeneity and Other potential determinants
Since the data we are using in the analysis is observational, it is difficult to disentangle
causality in the relationship we are studying. We follow best practices from previous
research to address the two main causes for endogeneity concerns: reversed causality and
omitted variable bias.
Reversed causality could be an issue in our analysis to the extent that high mortality
rates could drive voters to choose female candidates in elections, as citizens might believe
that female candidates are in better position to address such issues. To mitigate that
issue, our main models use 5-year lags of the independent variables. This lag structure
also reflects the fact that our outcome variables are likely to change slowly as the im-
plementation of any policy is time-consuming, e.g. a new training program for doctors
and nurses, building new health or education facilities, or providing better equipment
to existing ones. It is also reasonable to expect that the response to increased female
representation would not be immediate. Voters need time to evaluate politicians’ per-
formance in order to exercise accountability and “throw the rascals out” if need be. We
therefore employ a lag that corresponds to the election cycle in many countries.6 We also
estimate system-GMM models with 5-year average panels, which are designed to address
endogeneity concerns and to analyze relationships with slow-changing variables.
In addition to our explanatory variables, we expect variation in progress toward
achieving women’s policy priorities to reflect a number of other country-specific fac-
tors. We control for what we see as most likely to cause omitted variable bias: reliance
on foreign aid, income per capita, share of urban population, corruption, larger societal
changes affecting both social norms and political will, and conflict. The rationale for each
variable is given below.
We also estimate parsimonious models as robustness checks in order to address any
potential worries for post-treatment bias from including some of these controls. For
instance, foreign aid is partly endogenous to institutional features and politics more
broadly, and potentially to gender representation more specifically. There are also studies
suggesting that female politicians engage less in corrupt activities, so corruption may also
be partially post-treatment.
3.5.1 Foreign Aid
In the context we study, our outcomes of interest are likely to be affected by external
as well as domestic factors. For instance, in his study of Guatemala, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, and Nigeria, Shiffman (2007) notes the importance of transnational influence in
shaping domestic political priority to reduce maternal mortality – particularly in terms
of norm promotion and resource provision (those agencies’ provision of financial and
6This is fairly standard in the literature on this topic (Bratton and Ray, 2002).
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technical resources). Indeed, foreign aid to maternal, newborn, and child health accounts
for a substantial proportion of overall public spending in many developing countries.
African countries have been the overwhelming beneficiaries of such aid. For example,
in Ethiopia, outside sources accounted for nearly half of all reproductive and maternal
health expenditures between 2004 and 2011 (Countdown to 2015, N.d.). At the same
time, in recent decades global norms about gender equality in public office have shifted
dramatically, leading, among other things, to the introduction of gender quotas (Krook,
2006a). The presence of donors and international aid could be one reason why countries
decide to be more inclusive of women in governance.
3.5.2 Democracy
In addition, we include a measure for democracy as a confounding variable in our models.
As outlined in the theory section, we expect that regime type would affect both the
development outcomes we are looking at, as well as the number of women elected in
positions of power but also the extent to which they would be able to make a difference
once in office. We use V-Dem’s Free and Fair Elections Index, which captures the extent
to which elections in a country are free and fair. We prefer this relatively narrow proxy
for regime type since more comprehensive measures also capture the extent of freedom
of discussion and freedom of association, aspects that are potentially correlated with the
Women’s civil society participation index.
3.5.3 Income per Capita
More affluent countries tend to devote a greater share of resources to health and education.
This may mean that greater availability of resources facilitates allocating a greater share
to these purposes, or that countries with better supported health and education systems
have a stronger human capital base and thus are more successful economically. Budget
deficits and the debt crisis have also had a constraining effect on health and education
expenditures, in contrast to their effect on social security expenditures (Huber, Mustillo
and Stephens, 2008).
3.5.4 Corruption
Previous research has also pointed out that good governance determines social well-being
(Lewis, 2006; Rothstein, 2011) since corruption and abuse of power can weaken politicians’
incentives to improve population health and lead to the under-provision of public goods
(Diamond, 2007; Rothstein, 2011). At the same time, rampant corruption can restrict
women’s access to political parties and public sector jobs (Stockemer, 2011; Rothstein
and Teorell, 2008). Female candidates frequently lack access to male-dominated clien-
telistic networks, which can be decisive to being elected (Randall and Sv˚asand, 2002).
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To account for the influence of corruption, we use V-Dem’s Political Corruption Index, a
comprehensive measure that taps into both petty and grand corruption as well as bribery
and theft and practices aimed at influencing law making and that affecting implementa-
tion (Coppedge et al 2018).
3.5.5 Shifts in global social norms
Additionally, in order to account for shifts in global social norms of the type that have led
to the adoption of quotas (and potentially influence our dependent variables) we follow
recent work(Kang and Kim, 2018) and consider the year 1995 as a milestone date, as
this was when the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, China. This
conference resulted in a major declaration calling for the inclusion of women in public
life at all levels, encouraging governments to promote gender balance in decision making
posts. Similarly, the regression analysis accounts for before and after the year 2000, when
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted. The MDGs played a key role
in promoting the reduction of maternal and child mortality, as well as improved access
to sanitation and water. These two events also mark significant shifts in the priorities of
international donors, which could affect both our dependent and independent variables.
We therefore estimate models with year fixed effects to capture any time trends in relevant
and unmeasured confounders. We also estimate more parsimonious models with dummy
variables for the 1995 and 2000 only, given their expected outsize impact on the areas we
are studying.
3.5.6 Conflict
The presence of international or domestic conflict is another factor that affects both
socio-economic outcomes as well as the number of women in parliament, given that men
are more likely to die in battle. Indeed, long-standing armed conflict has been shown
to substantially increase women’s political representation in sub-Saharan Africa, beyond
what can be explained by electoral institutions and democratization alone Hughes and
Tripp (2015).
4 Results
Figure 2 presents scatter plots with our main dependent and independent variables, show-
ing at first glance the expected direction of the relationship between our main variables
of interest. That is, countries with higher levels of women in parliament tend to have
lower infant and maternal mortality, and better access to clean water.
In order to interrogate this relationship more rigorously, Table 1 depicts the results
of regression analysis based on an ordinary least square estimator, which specifies an
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Figure 2: Scatter plot between main dependent and independent variables.
additive linear relationship. For each outcome variable we estimate two models. The first
set (Models 1, 3, and 5) include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side to
account for dynamic effects and autocorrelation in the residuals,Keele and Kelly (2005)7
as well as panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). A lagged dependent
variable also models that the current values of the dependent variable depend on its past
realizations; this also helps to control for any potential omitted variable affecting past
outcomes. In this set of models the independent variables are lagged by five years.8
The second specification (Models 2, 4, and 6) includes country and year-fixed effects,
which account for stable country factors as well as global trends in the evolution of
both women’s political representation and the various development policy outcomes. We
also include as a control variable a average of the dependent variable in sub-Saharan
Africa which takes into account regional characteristics such as disease epidemics or the
introduction of medical treatments specific to the region and time.
7That is, in time series data it is almost always the case that the residual at one point in time of
observation is correlated with other residuals. This is especially important with slow-moving and trended
dependent variables such as mortality rates.
8The dependent variable on the right-hand side is also lagged by five years. This means that the
models explain the difference in the dependent variable between the time women got elected and five
years later. The results are robust to alternative lag structures, using 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 years. Results for
1-year lags reported in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Regression results with share of women in parliament as main explanatory
variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infant
mortality
Infant
mortality
Maternal
mortality
Maternal
mortality
Access
to water
Access
to water
Women in parl. -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0175
(0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0039) (0.0442) (0.0153)
GDP per capita 0.0160∗∗ 0.0648∗ 0.0217∗∗ -0.0003 0.7151∗∗∗ 0.9332
(0.0069) (0.0330) (0.0093) (0.0499) (0.000) (0.7184)
International aid -0.0018 0.0010 0.0075 0.0211 0.7429∗∗∗ -0.0511
(0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0094) (0.0201) (0.000) (0.0861)
Democracy -0.1364∗∗∗ -0.0566 -0.0122 0.0617 3.7786∗∗∗ -0.3922
(0.0140) (0.0523) (0.0240) (0.0505) (0.000) (0.6374)
Urban population 0.0088∗∗∗ -0.0653 0.0175∗∗ -0.2026 -0.8152∗∗ -2.3892∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0838) (0.0077) (0.2153) (0.000) (1.1175)
Corruption -0.1376∗∗∗ -0.1875∗∗ -0.0043 -0.0655 3.0880∗∗∗ -2.0624∗
(0.0130) (0.0856) (0.0238) (0.1210) (0.000) (1.0401)
LDV 0.9686∗∗∗ 0.9975∗∗∗ 0.9156∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0219) (0.000)
Regional average DV -37.0555∗∗∗ -33.1715∗∗∗ -38.2334∗∗∗
(2.3274) (2.4375) (1.0993)
N 1408 1408 946 946 718 718
R2 0.957 0.909 0.948 0.789 0.977 0.978
Lag 5 years 5 years 5 years 5 years 5 years 5 years
Model PCSE Two-way FE PCSE Two-way FE PCSE Two-way FE
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1 depicts a significant negative association between descriptive representation
and infant and maternal mortality, and access to clean water in the first set of models.
That is, a greater proportion of women in parliament is associated with lower numbers of
infant and maternal deaths, as well as access to clean water, accounting for past values
of the dependent variable and important covariates such as aid, democracy, corruption,
urbanization and wealth. This statistically significant result also holds in the second,
stricter specification of the model with two-way fixed effects for infant mortality only. This
means that the the effect of women’s representation on infant mortality is independent
from time-trends that could affect both development and women’s representation (such
as global norm changes or major historical events) and slowly changing country-specific
characteristics (such as geography or social norms), and when accounting for general
trends in the dependent variable by including the average score for the region on the
right-hand side of the equation for this regression. The results are not robust when we
consider maternal mortality and access to clean water as outcome variables in the second
set of models which include two-way fixed effects.
We next proceed to interpret the substantive size of the effects for infant mortality
- the variable for which we consistently find statistically significant results. (Since the
dependent variable is logged, it is difficult to interpret the effect sizes in the regression
table.) We use the software Clarify(King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000) to estimate the
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Figure 3: Predicted values of infant mortality by levels of women in parliament.
predicted values over time of infant mortality when the proportion of women in parliament
is at different levels. Figure 3 shows the predicted values for mortality with uncertainty
estimates around them, as calculated by the dynamic model in Table 1, for two scenarios:
when the percentage of women in parliament is 0 (blue dots) and when the share is 60
(historically, maximum value for Africa, shown in red squares), while all other variables
are held at their mean. Importantly, the effect on infant mortality of having more women
in parliament increases substantially over time, compared to no women in parliament.
When transformed back to the original values mortality rates at time period ten when
there are no women in parliament are estimated to be around 75 deaths per 1,000 (Ivory
Coast in 2011), and around 55 deaths (Ghana in 2007) when women in parliament are at
their maximum value.
Finally, the results for the control variables mostly go in line with existing research and
theoretical expectations. Higher GDP per capita, more foreign aid, stronger democratic
institutions, and less corruption tend to be associated with improved outcomes. The
share of urban population shows less consistent results as a predictor of the dependent
variables. In some models, however, the coefficient for democracy has an opposite sign
to the one we expect (e.g. in Model 4 in Table 1), that is, higher levels of democracy is
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associated with greater number of maternal deaths.9
4.1 Robustness checks
In the following two sub-sections we test the robustness of our findings both by employing
other estimation strategies, and by looking at alternative dependent variables, including
some that serve as placebo tests.
4.1.1 Alternative model specifications
The literature on panel data analysis does not give a clear answer to the question of
which models best fit the complex two-dimensional data structure of countries over time.
Therefore, we compare the results from different models for the three dependent variables
of interest. Tables A2, A3, and A4 in the Appendix show the following six alternative
estimations of the main models presented in the previous section:
1. A parsimonious model, which does not have international aid, democracy and cor-
ruption on the right-hand side, as these might cause post-treatment bias. This
model explores within-country variation, accounting for country-specific omitted
factors in the model specifications.
2. Year fixed effects added to the previous model.
3. Country fixed effects with one-year lags of the independent variables, which should
be compared with the 5-year lags in our main models. The dependent variable
is differenced by one year, which is a common strategy when the data is highly
trended.10
4. Full model with all control variables, country and year fixed effects but with one
year lag for the regional average in the dependent variable (as opposed to five years
as in our main models).
5. Full model with all control variables but with country-fixed effects only. This should
be compared to our main model which also has year-fixed effects.
9A possible explanation for this result is that the relationship might not be linear since for the
countries with the lowest and highest levels of democracy the number of women in parliament might
be less relevant for policy outcomes. That is, for example, in closed autocracies parliamentarians might
not have the de facto power to influence policy outcomes. By contrast, in fully developed democracies,
the accountability relationship between members of parliament and their constituents could be utilized
equally well no matter if the member of parliament is a man or a woman.
10Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots in panel data also suggest that all three dependent variables are
stationary with a trend. The residuals in the fixed-effects models also contain unit root but not after
differencing the data.
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6. System-GMM estimator, which is appropriate in cases where the dependent variable
is slow changing, and affected by its own past values. The system GMM estimator
also mitigates problems stemming from the fact that the independent variables
might not be strictly exogenous, and are therefore correlated with past or present
realizations of the error term (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998)
As advised by the literature, we estimate these models on five-year average panels.11
According to these models the share of women in parliament remains a significant
predictor of infant mortality at the statistical significance at level 0.01 or 0.1 no matter
the model specification. However, the results for the other two dependent variables are
less consistent. For example, in the system-GMM model the share of women in parliament
is significantly associated with maternal mortality but this is not the case in the more
simple country-fixed effects model. Since we do not know what the true data generating
process is for these variables, we cannot say that we find stable evidence for significant
association between women in parliament and maternal mortality or access to clean water.
Another challenge to our empirical analysis is that there are many country-years
for which there are no women in parliament. To explore this, we re-estimate the main
regression by transforming the main independent variable into a binary one - where 0
corresponds to no women in parliament, and 1 to having one or more female legislators.
Table A5 in the Appendix shows that the coefficients for this binary variable is not
statistically significant on its own (Model 1), and the significant results hold for the
continuous variable when we control for the presence of women (Model 2). This finding
goes in line with evidence from previous studies that for the presence of women to matter
in substantive terms, the number of women is important and introducing just a small
share of seats for women might not make a difference Dahlerup (2006); Grey (2006).
Next, we proceed to estimate models with several other factors that might affect our
outcome variables. We test the robustness of our results when we include a dummy
variable for the year before and after key events that we would expect to change the
development of our variables of interest, namely, the introduction of the MDGs and the
Beijing conference on women. The results shown in Table A8 in the Appendix remain
largely unchanged with a statistically significant relationship for infant mortality but not
for maternal mortality and access to clean water. The same goes when we control for
international and internal armed conflict, as shown in Table A9 in the Appendix.
Finally, we test an alternative specification for the dependent variable by using child
mortality (under-5 death rates) rather than infant mortality. Table A6 in the Appendix
shows that the results hold for child mortality as the dependent variable.
11More detailed discussion of this model and its specification can be found in the Appendix.
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4.1.2 Placebo Test
To further interrogate whether there is something specific about our main dependent
variables of interest and women in politics, we also test whether greater presence of women
in parliament is associated with another key development outcome – electrification. In
this way we aim to test the notion that all good things go together – that a given
country is improving on all developmental aspects. We choose electrification as a placebo
outcome variable since our theory would not predict an association between more women
in parliament and improved infrastructure, given that the latter is a development outcome
that men are more likely to prioritize (Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, 2016). We proxy
for electrification with night-light data.
This test also allows us to discount an alternative mechanism for the association
between female representation and improvement in policy areas that matter to women –
that women are in general more trustworthy and public-spirited than men and should be
more effective in reducing corruption (Dollar, Fisman and Gatti, 2001). Given that, as
mentioned above, corruption has been found to be associated with the under-provision
of public goods, this could represent an alternative channel through which women could
promote improved service delivery. If this channel is operating, then we should expect
to see improved outcomes across all types of public goods – not only those that women
tend to prioritize.
Table A7 depicts the results of our placebo test. We do not see a significant association
between the share of women in parliament and electrification, giving us greater confidence
that the preceding empirical results serve to corroborate our theory.
In sum, our results suggest that a greater proportion of women in parliament is
associated with lower numbers of infant and children deaths and these results hold across
different model specifications. We do not find stable evidence for maternal deaths and
access to clean water.
4.2 Resource Mobilization for Women’s Policy Priorities
Progress towards the outcomes we study can require both policy changes and shifting
public spending priorities. In order to reduce infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa,
governments need to spend considerable resources on programs such as malaria control,
immunizations, and reproductive healthcare. Since we hypothesize that women will pri-
oritize such health-related outcomes, then the composition of the budget in legislatures
featuring large numbers of women should be characterized by an increased share of public
resources for health.
Model 1 in Table 2 depicts the results of regression analysis with the percentage
of public health expenditures (as share of GDP per capita) as main outcome variable.
In addition, we estimate a model where military expenditure is the dependent variable
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(Model 2). This model serves as another placebo test – we would not expect the number
of women in parliament to have a significant association with military expenditure. The
results suggest that having more women in parliament is positively associated with greater
public expenditures for health (2.5 percentage points on average), while the association
with the military expenditure is negative.12
Table 2: Regressions of resource mobilization on female representation
(1) (2)
Health
expenditure
Military
expenditure
Women in parl. 0.025∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
GDP per capita -0.629∗ 0.027
(0.365) (0.316)
International aid 0.171∗∗∗ -0.098
(0.059) (0.143)
Democracy -0.337 -2.212∗∗
(0.740) (0.844)
Urban population 1.321∗∗ 0.391
(0.620) (0.312)
Corruption 0.344 -3.810∗
(1.119) (2.092)
N 634 1072
R2 0.192 0.092
Country FE Yes Yes
Independent variables lagged with 1 year.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.3 Impact of Women’s Participation
According to our gendered accountability framework, the influence of women in the legis-
lature will be enhanced when female citizens are taking action to hold their representatives
to account. Such actions may be direct or take place through civil society organizations
and the media. We therefore estimate an interaction effect between descriptive represen-
tation and the degree of female participation. Model 1 in Table A10 in the Appendix
presents our regression estimates. All models employ country and year fixed-effects, and
five-year lags of the independent variables.
We find a statistically significant interaction between women’s participation and the
share of women in parliament when it comes to reducing infant mortality. That is, we
find evidence that the effect of each of these two variables depends on the levels of the
other. We do not find support for the same interaction effect on maternal mortality and
access to water with women’s participation.
12The models on the budget expenditures do not include year-fixed effects due to the relatively short
time coverage - the data for health expenditure is available only from 1995 to 2014.
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Figure 4 depicts the effects from our regression analysis. On the left hand side of the
figure, we present the conditional effect of women in parliament on infant mortality at
different levels of women’s participation. The negative effect on infant mortality of having
more women in parliament is stronger for countries with higher participation of women in
civil society and media. The effect becomes significant around 0.4 on this 0-to-1 measure,
or contexts in which the space for civil society and media is not completely restricted.
Figure 4: Interaction of share of women in legislature and women’s civil society partici-
pation (DV = Infant Mortality)
The right-hand panel shows that the effect of women’s participation on infant mortal-
ity becomes statistically significantly only after the proportion of women in parliament
reaches a certain level (around the mean values).13 This suggests that representation in
political institutions is important for achieving improved development outcomes, in order
for women’s participation to meaningfully influence policy outcomes.
13Note that in this analysis we use the logged values of women in parliament but the results do not
change when using the non-transformed version.
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(a) Electoral systems (b) Existence of gender quotas
Figure 5: The effect on infant mortality of the interaction between share of women in
parliament (logged) and formal representation
4.4 Gendered Accountability and Formal Representation
Our theoretical framework also anticipates that the rules and procedures to select repre-
sentatives are important conditions affecting the realization of gendered accountability.
Specifically, we consider gender quotas, type of electoral system, and the extent to which
there is competition among political parties.
Table A11 in the Appendix summarizes the findings from the regression analysis of
interaction terms between share of women in parliament and the existence of quotas,
type of electoral system, and barriers to forming a party. We find statistically significant
interactions between descriptive representation and some of the institutions of formal
representation. In particular, the effect of having more women in power is stronger when
there is a quota system in place, and the electoral system is not simply majoritarian.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between infant mortality and the interaction between
the share of women in parliament and two institutions of formal representation. In Figure
5a, we compare the influence of having more women in parliament on mortality rates when
the electoral system is majoritarian (shown in solid black line) and when there is some
proportional element (red dashed line). In Figure 5b, we see the effect for countries with
electoral quotas (orange dashed line) and for countries without quotas (purple solid line).
In both cases the results go in line with our theoretical expectations: there is a strong
negative effect on mortality in countries with proportional or mixed electoral systems and
for those that have adopted quotas.
The results are less clear when we consider the extent to which there is competition
among political parties. Figure 6 shows that countries with multi-party systems (green
dashed line) tend to have lower infant mortality rates than in countries with closed
systems (blue solid line) but the difference is not substantially large and is not statistically
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significant at the highest numbers of women in parliament.14 This implies that having
more women in parliament is significantly associated with lower death rates even in
autocracies. However, when we divide the sample into one- and multi-party states and
re-estimate the same models we do see a difference between the different types of regimes.
(These results are shown in Table A12 in the Appendix.) We see that the coefficients
for infant mortality hold only when party competition is allowed. In countries where
it is virtually impossible to form opposition parties, we do not observe a significant
association between women in parliament and any of the development outcomes we are
considering. By contrast, when some political opposition is allowed, the significant and
negative association between women political representation and infant mortality remains.
These conflicting results between the split sample and interaction regressions suggest that
the difference in the significance of the results in the former estimation strategy could be
driven by other covariates (for example, income or corruption could be highly correlated
both with democracy and mortality).
Figure 6: Interaction of share of women in legislature (logged) and barriers to forming
political parties (DV = Infant Mortality)
5 Discussion
The results presented above suggest a nuanced relationship between descriptive and sub-
stantive representation. First, we show that the link is most robust for explaining re-
ductions in infant and child mortality, whereas having more women in the legislature is
not clearly associated with reducing maternal mortality improving access to clean water.
14Note that the interaction term in the regression analysis is not statistically significant, although the
components are significant on their own.
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This calls into question the implications of previous studies based on select policy out-
comes, and more generally confirms Kramon and Posner (2013), who caution that “the
outcome one studies affects the answer one gets.”
Why does gendered accountability appear to be present for some outcomes but not
others? Electoral accountability for basic service provision is most likely to occur in
policy areas where voters can verify whether the promise has been kept (Harding and
Stasavage, 2013). The implementation of a given policy is therefore likely to be char-
acterized by greater political will when user benefits can be more clearly attributed to
political intervention, and when interventions are more visible (Batley and Mcloughlin,
2015). Following Mani and Mukand (2007), we may understand the relative visibility of
different public goods as the degree to which citizens can assess government effort based
on observed outcomes. Differences in visibility reflect both the ease with which one can
observe or measure public goods outcomes, as well as a public good’s “complexity” –
the factors other than government effort that affect the outcome. One important aspect
affecting complexity is the degree to which service provision depends on factors beyond
the intentions and actions of members of parliament and the executive. In the context we
study, water provision is a complex outcome, given that it has been decentralized in most
African countries, with further responsibilities devolved to water users (Carlitz, 2017).
As such, it can be difficult for central government politicians to claim credit for improved
access to clean water. This relationship is further complicated by the degree of foreign
aid to the water sector.
Even when politicians can realistically claim credit for implementing a given policy,
they may be less inclined to do so when the appropriate policy solution is not clear,
or when the issue is not one seen as a priority of the broader public. Pertinent to the
present study, safe motherhood’s relatively low priority in many countries has been ar-
gued to reflect divisions in the policy community regarding the appropriate intervention
strategy, the fact that maternal deaths are not as common as those caused by other
high-burden disorders (HIV/AIDS, malaria), and the difficulty of accurately measuring
maternal mortality (Shiffman and Smith, 2007). Furthermore, interventions to avert ma-
ternal health are frequently not as simple as those for some other development priorities.
For example, Tanzania’s dramatic decline in child mortality between 1995-2007 (a 35%
reduction, nearly twice the regional average during that period) has been attributed to
increased coverage of key malaria control interventions like the use of bed nets and access
to first-line antimalarial drugs (Croke, 2012). Maternal mortality has been seen as more
intractable.
Beyond highlighting differences across policy outcomes, our results also delineate so-
cietal and institutional conditions under which female politicians will be more inclined to
take action to the further the interests of female voters. First, we show that the influence
of women in parliament is strengthened in countries where women participate relatively
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more in civil society. This can put increased pressure on female representatives to act in
female citizens’ interest. These quantitative results go in line with qualitative evidence
from the countries in our sample. For instance, in post-genocide Rwanda, prior to the
adoption of gender quotas, women civil society organizations (CSOs) joined forces with
the few women MPs in the transitional national assembly to lobby for changes to ex-
clusionary inheritance laws. In addition, women CSOs played an important role in that
country to successfully lobby for the adoption of gender quotas (Bauer and Burnet, 2013).
In Uganda, the strength of women’s organizations and the relationships between civil so-
ciety actors and pro-women MPs are seen as essential for the successful advancement of
legislation benefiting women (Wang, 2013).
Finally, we demonstrate the importance of particular electoral institutions – namely
gender quotas and proportional representation – when it comes to strengthening the link
between descriptive and substantive representation. It is also important to note that our
empirical results may represent an underestimate of this link. In many cases, descriptive
representation may lead to substantive representation in more process-oriented terms,
such as introducing and/or supporting bills that address women’s issues, networking
with female constituents or women’s organizations, or advancing women’s issues within
committees or party delegations (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). There are a number
of examples of such process-oriented developments in the context we study. For example,
in Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, cross-party coalitions of female Parliamentarians
have formed as women have increased their presence in the national legislature and have
played an important role to coordinate the development of shared legislative agendas and
facilitate lobbying (Devlin and Elgie, 2008; Johnson and Josefsson, 2016; Yoon, 2011).
While such process-oriented developments are necessary for laws and policies to be
enacted that ultimately influence the outcomes we study, they are no guarantee that
such outcomes will be realized. The gap between policy and implementation is an oft-
cited challenge across sectors in many African countries. Such gaps can stem from a
given policy outcome not being perceived as a public problem, failures to seize existing
windows of opportunity, and a lack of policy entrepreneurs.Ridde (2009) This implies that
gendered accountability may be most likely to succeed when it aims at promoting policies
that are not exclusively the domain of women. Such an interpretation is supported by
our results, since infant mortality is arguably an issue that touches other people beyond
the women who serve as primary caretakers for infants and children.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that increasing descriptive representation can have meaningful impli-
cations for the realization of policy goals that matter to women, particularly when female
citizens are politically aware and engaged. These findings are highly policy-relevant given
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that all of the outcomes we study correspond to internationally agreed upon development
targets – specifically, indicators used to assess countries’ progress toward achieving the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and their successors, the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs). The present study therefore allows us to take stock of countries’
achievements of a number of the MDGs, and also the likelihood that these countries will
meet various SDGs. This is important given that many countries, particularly in Africa,
did not meet the reductions in infant and maternal mortality targeted in the MDGs.
Our analysis also suggests that the link between descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation is not automatic, and that not all “women’s issues” are equally achievable as
a result of having more women elected to public office. Further research is needed to
better understand the constraints that female politicians confront when it comes to ef-
fective advocacy on behalf of their female constituents. One issue may be the nature of
women representatives’ contributions to parliamentary debates. For instance, scholars
have shown that women elected to reserved seats in the Ugandan parliament are signif-
icantly less likely to be recognized in plenary debates over time as compared to their
male and female colleagues in open seats (Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2014). There-
fore, further work is needed to understand how speaking in parliament corresponds to
policy implementation. In order to understand additional constraints, ethnographic work
along the lines of Bauer and Burnet (2013)’s study of female MPs in Rwanda would
be enlightening. Systematic surveys of politicians that allow for meaningful comparison
across gender would also add to our knowledge base. To date, such surveys have been
exceedingly rare in the African context. However, given that descriptive representation
of women in Africa is now on par with the global average, it is high time that we gain a
better understanding of the experiences and challenges these legislators face.
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The data on maternal mortality, coming from the World Health OrganizationAlkema,
Chou, Hogan, Zhang, Moller, Gemmill, Fat, Boerma, Temmerman, Mathers et al. (2016)
is reported in terms of deaths per 100,000 live births in a year. Infant mortality is
measured as the number of deaths prior to the age of 1 per 1,000 live births. We accessed
the data through the V-Dem data set, which draws on GapminderGapminder (N.d.), with
additional data imputed from Clio-Infra Clio-Infra (2014). Missing data within a time-
series is interpolated and imputed by employing linear models.The infant mortality data
stretches back to 1900 but in our analysis we only use data after 1950 due to limitations
in the time coverage of the explanatory variables. In addition, Gapminder notes that
historic estimates on mortality prior to 1950 are generally less accurate.
We use the World Development Indicators database for the percentage of the popula-
tion using improved water suppliesKaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). “Improved”
sources include: piped water on premises (piped household water connection located
inside the user’s dwelling, plot or yard), and other improved drinking water sources (pub-
lic taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs,
and rainwater collection). The underlying source for this data is WHO/UNICEF Joint
Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation.15
We use a measure of the sum of commitments received from donors and international
organizations. The source is AidDataTierney, Nielson, Hawkins, Roberts, Findley, Pow-
ers, Parks, Wilson and Hicks (2011) (accessed through QoG database). Data for donors
is available since 1962, and for international organizations only since 1947, and the end
of the time series is 2013.
Our data on GDP is measured on a per capita basis from the Maddison-ProjectBolt
and Zanden (2014), and was accessed through the V-Dem data set.
We incorporate data on gender quotas from V-Dem. The variable we use captures
both voluntary quotas and reserved seats in the legislature.16
We proxy for electrification with night-light data from the United States Air Force De-
fense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Nighttime Lights Time Series.17 MinMin,
Gaba, Sarr and Agalassou (2013) validates the measure to show that it is correlated with
access to electrification – electrified villages appear brighter in satellite imagery because
of the presence of streetlights, and brightness increases with the number of streetlights.
Thus, we consider night lights to be a good proxy for infrastructure building. Following
AlesinaAlesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) we use the average light values
from all pixels within each spatial unit of analysis divided by the population to arrive at
15https://washdata.org/
16The variable ranges from 0-4, with the scores corresponding to the following: 0: No national level
gender quota; 1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance; 2:
Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance; 3. Yes, statutory
gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance; 4: Yes, there are reserved seats in
the legislature for women.
17https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
36
the measure we use in the regression analysis.
We use the V-Dem variable Barriers to parties to distinguish between highly closed
regimes, where opposition parties are not allowed or it is virtually impossible for par-
ties not affiliated with the government to form (categories 0, 1 and 2), and regimes
where meaningful opposition is possible (categories 3 and 4). The data on barriers to
parties, quality of elections, the political corruption index and women’s civil society par-
ticipation comes from the V-Dem data set, aggregating coding from more than 3,200
experts.Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Krusell and Miri (2018)
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Table A11: Regression results for Interaction terms between Share of women in parliament
and Formal Representation (DV= Infant mortality)
(1) (2) (3)
Women in parl. (log) −0.005 −0.006 −0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Gender quotas 0.321∗∗∗
(0.040)
Electoral systems 0.043∗∗∗
(0.015)
Barriers to parties −0.025∗∗
(0.011)
Women in parl. × Quotas −0.130∗∗∗
(0.014)
Women in parl. × El. systems −0.017∗∗∗
(0.006)
Women in parl. × Barriers 0.003
(0.005)
Clean elections −0.061∗∗∗ −0.029∗ −0.026∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
GDP per capita 0.026∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Corruption −0.093∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
LDV 0.766∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
Constant 0.998∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.144) (0.136)
Observations 1,953 1,564 1,954
R2 0.969 0.977 0.967
Adjusted R2 0.966 0.975 0.965
Two-way FE Yes Yes Yes
Lags 5 years 5 years 5 years
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A12: Regression results for the effect of women in parliament on infant mortality,
split sample to one- and multi-party state (DV= Infant mortality)
(1) (2)
One-party Multi-party
Women in parl. -0.004 -0.003∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Regional Average DV -28.660∗∗∗ -36.560∗∗∗
(6.396) (2.805)
GDP per capita -0.143∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.062) (0.048)
International aid -0.022∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.008) (0.005)
Urban population 0.026 -0.054
(0.094) (0.082)
Corruption 0.090 -0.120
(0.153) (0.117)
N 382 1029
R2 0.716 0.919
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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